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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of hyperbolic discounting preferences on the agent’s
information acquisition decision who wants to undertake a potential dangerous ac-
tivity for human health or the environment. We find that below certain discount
rate threshold, an agent prefers ignoring information and continuing his project.
On the other hand, above this threshold, it is optimal for him to acquire infor-
mation, and the investment for acquiring the information is increasing with the
discount rate. We then conclude that hyperbolic discounting preferences limit the
information acquisition. Moreover, we explain that the lack of self-control induced
by hyperbolic discounting preferences also restraints the information acquisition.
Finally, we analyze the efficiency of the strict liability rule and the negligence rule
to motivate the agent to acquire information.
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Introduction
A recent report of the European Commission (Aho, 2006) emphasizes the large gap be-
tween the scientific and technological knowledge of European countries and the relatively
low level of innovation. Actually, the non-stability and/or the lack of information char-
acterizing innovations constitute one of the main barriers to innovation. As an example
of scientific innovation, one could point out genetically modified organisms (GMO)([29]).
The general principle of producing GMO is to add genetic material into an organism’s
genome to generate new traits. Examples of GMOs are highly diverse several fish species,
transgenic plants (e.g. tomatoes), medicines (e.g. gene therapy), or agricultural products
(e.g. golden rice). As for many innovations, we do not perfectly know the effects that
GMOs may entail on people’s health and/or on the environment. The recent debate
on the toxicity of transgenic maize plants MON863 emphasizes the difficulties to define
what should be the adequate and proportionate decision to take under such a context
of scientific uncertainty. If recent scientific studies seem to point out a potential danger
due to the consumption of this kind of transgenic plants, maize MON863 is not forbid-
den in France while it is, for example, in Netherlands (Seralini, Cellier and Spiroux de
Vendomoix, 2007). Indeed, the French ”Commission du Ge´nie biomole´culaire” (CGB)
concludes in their experts report that ”the results of the toxicological study did not point
out any toxic effects on rats kidney due to the consumption of maize 863” (CGB, June
15th 2007). In such a context, should we limit technological and scientific innovation as
it is done regarding GMOs production in California (United States) or in Prince Edward
Island (Canada), which ban all of them to prevent a possible risk? On the other hand,
would not it be more relevant to encourage innovation’s and research’s efforts at the same
time in order to reduce scientific uncertainties and to behave according to the information
they could obtain from it?
The European report on innovation concludes that there is a real need for action to im-
plement what it defines as a ”pact for research and innovation” (Aho, 2006). Indeed,
investing in research and development allows a reduction of the scientific uncertainty
which characterizes the innovations. In this regard, the precautionary principle, as a
public decision criteria, proposes to combine innovation, security and information acqui-
sition (Pouillard, 1999, Henry and Henry, 2004). It inspires many European directives
and propositions that aim at protecting health and environment. Thus, the directive
on environmental liability proposes to apply the ’pollutant-payer’ principle: if a damage
happens, the pollutant has to pay for it. The investors are then liable for eventual inci-
dent due to their activities. The goal of this principle is to act directly on the investors
behaviours to increase their prevention and research efforts. Mechanisms based on lia-
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bility rules, such as a strict liability rule (which use is in the spirit of the application
of the precautionary principle) or a negligence rule, are used to protect consumers as
well as the environment by improving the control and the prevention of risks induced
by firms’ activities and products. However, uncertainty limits their efficiency but also
induces contradictory effects on both innovation and security. For example, regarding
technological risks, Sinclair-Desgagne´ and Vachon (1999) note that limited liability leads
to less prevention and the extension of the liability to all the firm’s partners may limit
innovating efforts. To go further in the current debate on precaution and economic de-
velopment, one should investigate what determines, under existing liability framework,
the innovation decision of an investor regarding activities for which scientific knowledge
is still incomplete.
Individual risks perception and thus risks assessment is never exempt of subjectivity.
For example, according to Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982), people undervalue
or overvalue small probabilities in proportion to the importance of potential damages,
and according to their past experiences. In a more general way, as emphasized by sev-
eral empirical studies, risk perception and thus, individual preferences change over time
(Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002). Strotz (1956) is the first to suggest an
alternative to exponential discounting. Phelps and Pollack (1968) introduce the func-
tional form of this kind of changing preferences. Let D(k) represent a discount function
such that: {
D(k) = 1 if k = 0;
D(k) = βδk if k > 0.
We can define a hyperbolic discounted utility function as follows:
Ut =
T−t∑
k=0
D(k)uk.
Elster (1979) applies this (β, δ) formalization to a decision problem in characterizing
time inconsistency by a decreasing discount rate between the present and the future and
a constant discount rate between two future periods. Laibson (1997, 1998) then uses this
formulation to saving and consumption problems, while other economists like Be´nabou,
Tirole (2002, 2004) and Carrillo, Mariotti (2000) apply it into the problem of information
acquisition. In particular, Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) describe intertemporal consump-
tion’s decisions involving a potential risk in the long run. They show that hyperbolic
discounting can favour strategic ignorance. Indeed, a person with time inconsistent pref-
erences might choose not to acquire free information in order to avoid over consumption or
engagement in activities, which may require much more fundamental research on poten-
tial social costs or externalities they could involve in the long term. However, if ignorance
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is a self-disciplining device when an agent is confronted to uncertainty and hyperbolic
discounting, is it then useless for him to acquire information to develop a project?
In this paper, we propose to analyze the impact of hyperbolic discounting preferences
on the agent’s information acquisition decision who wants to undertake a activities with
potential risks on health or the environment. We choose to both define information ac-
quisition as an investment in research1 to reduce the uncertainty on the potential risk
of damage, and to study innovator’s intertemporal choices as a joint product of many
conflicting psychological motives. Since empirical studies (Frederick and al., 2002) sug-
gest it, the innovator’s preferences are described by a hyperbolic discounting function.
In such a case, preferences are said to be time inconsistent. The discount rate β gath-
ers, as in Akerlof (1991) and Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), all the psychological motives
of the agent’s investment choice such that anxiety, confidence or impatience. If β = 1,
the psychological motives have no influence on his choice, and his preferences are time
consistent. On the other hand, if β < 1, the innovator is temporally inconsistent.
Under uncertainty, we first study the optimal decision-making of an innovator with hy-
perbolic discounting preferences. This allows us to analyze the direct impact of the
hyperbolic preferences on the information acquisition decision. We then study the lack
of self-control induced by the hyperbolic discounting preferences on the acquisition infor-
mation. In this regard, we define the self-control effect as the agent’s ability to commit
in the future. Finally, we study how two main forms of liability - strict liability and
negligence rule - may give incentives the innovator to acquire information. We choose
to provide the investment in research (i.e. information acquisition) as a measure of care,
in so far as it leads to a reduction of the uncertainty linked to the innovation, and to
decisions that may reduce the cost of damages suffered by both the innovator (according
to the liability rule enforced) and the environment in case of accident.
As a result, we show that below a certain discount rate threshold, acquiring information
is not optimal. The innovator prefers ignoring information in order to never stop his
project and to protect his innovation’s ability. On the other hand, above this threshold,
the investment in research is increasing with the value of β. We then conclude that
the hyperbolic discounting preferences limit the information acquisition and favours the
strategic ignorance. Moreover, we explain that the lack of self-control induced by hyper-
bolic discounting preferences also favours the strategic ignorance. Finally, because such
ignorance behaviours have to be regulated to both protect people and environment, we
1Such investment in research could be considered as a resort to private experts like private laboratory
or to any other private party able to provide scientific knowledge on the dangerousness or more generally
on the characteristics on the innovator’s activities
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show that, due to the hyperbolic discounting preferences and uncertainty, the impacts of
liability rules on the innovator’s ability to acquire information is not so clear. Indeed, hy-
perbolic discounting preferences limit the efficiency of the strict liability rule to motivate
the agent to acquire information. Nevertheless, we show that the negligence rule may be
an alternative tool to avoid the hyperbolic discounting preferences effect and then may
incentive the agent to acquire information.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 investigates
the optimal decision-making. Section 3 studies the self-control effect. Finally, section 4
proposes solutions, the strict liability and the negligence rule, to incentive the innovator
to acquire information. All proofs are in appendix.
1 The model
We consider a three periods model. At period 0, the innovator invests a given amount of
money I in a project that may create damage on the environment or on people health.
There are two possible states of the world: a dangerous state noted H and a less dangerous
state, L. The probability that a damage happens is θH in state H and θL in state L.
Since H is the most dangerous state of the world, we obtain
θL < θH .
At the beginning, the prior beliefs of the innovator are p0 on the state H and 1− p0 on
the state L. We then define the expected probability of the damage by
E(θ) = p0θ
H + (1− p0)θ
L.
At period 0, the innovator invests C ≥ 0 in research, to obtain information at period 1,
through a signal σ ∈ {h, l} on the true state of the world. We define the precision of the
signal as an increasing and concave function f(C) such that:
P (h|H, C) = P (l|L,C) = f(C) and P (h|L,C) = P (l|H, C) = 1− f(C)
and
f(0) = 1
2
; f ′(0) = +∞ and f ′(+∞) = 0.
Hence, the signal is not informative when the innovator does not invest in research and it
becomes more and more precise, i.e. P (h|H, C) increases and P (l|L,C) decreases when
C increases.
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According to Bayes’ rule,
P (h|H, C) =
p0f(C)
p0f(C) + (1− p0)(1− f(C))
and P (H|l, C) =
p0(1− f(C))
p0(1− f(C)) + (1− p0)f(C)
.
At period 1, according to the perceived signal the innovator decides to stop his project
with a probability 1 − x, or to continue it with a probability x, with x = xσ for signal
σ ∈ {l, h} . If the innovator stops the project, he recovers a part of his investment D
such that 0 < D < I . Nevertheless, if he decides completely to achieve it, he wil receive
a positive return R2 at the next period (period 2).
An accident may occur at period 2. If it occurs while the innovator has prematurely
stopped his project, he suffers a financial cost K ′ related to the damages. But if it occurs
while he has decided to complete the project, the financial cost K is higher. So, we
assume
0 < K ′ < K.
We define by BS the undiscounted benefit to continue the project instead of stopping it
at period 1, when the state of nature is S ∈ {L,H}, i.e.
BS = (R2 − θ
SK)− (D − θSK ′).
We assume that the undiscounted benefit is positive in state L while it is negative in
state H so
BH < 0 < BL.
A collection of risk-neutral incarnations with conflicting goals represents the innovator’s
preferences.2 At each period t, there is only one incarnation called ”self-t”. Each self-t
depreciates the following period with a discount rate β < 1.3 In our model, we consider
that β represents the salience of current payoffs relative to the future stream of returns.
Remember our GMOs farmer’s example, his confidence with GMOs may decrease over
time because of a better knowledge of their potential negative effects (i.e. reduction of
the scientific uncertainty), which could imply period-to-period different decisions.
Hence, intertemporal expected payoffs of self-t= 0, 1, 2 may be expressed recursively. If
signal σ has been perceived, self-2’s intertemporal expected payoff is written as
V2(xσ, σ, C) = xσ[P (H|σ,C)(R2 − θ
HK) + (1− P (H|σ,C))(R2 − θ
LK)]
−(1− xσ)[P (H|σ,C)θ
HK ′ + (1− P (H|σ,C))θLK ′].
2Following Strotz (1956), this conflict is captured by assuming that the innovator’s preferences are
dynamically inconsistent.
3Akerlof (1991) defines β as the ”salience of current payoffs relative to the future stream of returns”,
but it is also interpreted in the literature as a lack of willpower (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2002), of fore-
sight (Masson (2002), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)) or as impatience or impulsiveness (Ainslie, 1992).
Moreover, to simplify the (β, δ) formalization, we assume that δ = 1.
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Likewise, self-1’s intertemporal expected payoff is
V1(xσ, σ, C) = (1− xσ)D + βV2(xσ, σ, C).
Finally, self-0’s intertemporal expected payoff is
V0(xh, xl, C) = −I − C + β[p0f(C) + (1− p0)(1− f(C))](V2(xh, h, C) + (1− xh)D)
+β[(1− p0)f(C) + p0(1− f(C))](V2(xl, l, C) + (1− xl)D).
We define θ̂(β) as the damage probability threshold for which self-1 is indifferent between
stopping or carrying on the project to the end. Since θ̂(β) is such that D − βK ′ =
β(R2 −K), we obtain
θ̂(β) =
βR2 −D
β(K −K ′)
.
We also assume that
E(θ) ≤ θ̂(β) which is equivalent to βR2 − βE(θ)K ≥ D − βE(θ)K
′. (1)
Hence, if no research effort is made (C = 0), i.e. with No Learning, self-1 continues the
project to the end.
So, self-0’s expected payoff with No Learning is written as
V NL0 (β) = −I + β[p0(R2 − θ
HK) + (1− p0)(R2 − θ
LK)].
= −I + β[R2 − E(θ)K].
2 The optimal decision-making
We now turn to the innovator’s optimal decision-making. Subsection 2.1 studies self-1’s
optimal decision to continue the project or to stop it, and subsection 2.2 determines
self-0’s optimal decision to acquire information.
2.1 Stopping or continuing the project
At period 1, if self-1 is uninformed he always continues his project. However, if he gets
information, he receives a signal σ ∈ {h, l} on the probability of damage and updates
his beliefs. According to this information, he has to choose either to complete or not his
project. Formally, for σ ∈ {h, l} and for all C ≥ 0, self-1 continues the project if his
expected payoff when he continues the project is higher than when he stops it, i.e.
V1(1, σ, C) ≥ V1(0, σ, C).
After signal σ ∈ h, l has been perceived, let E(θ|σ,C) = P (H|σ,C)θH +(1−P (H|σ,C))θL
be the expected probability of a damage and x∗σ the equilibrium strategy.
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Proposition 1 If E(θ|σ,C) ≤ θ̂(β), then x∗σ = 1: the innovator continues the project; if
θ̂(β) < E(θ|σ,C), then x∗σ = 0: the innovator stops the project.
Proposition 1 characterizes the conditions on the revised expected probability of the dam-
age, E(θ|σ,C), under which self-1 decides to partially or completely achieve his project.
These two cases may arise. If E(θ|σ,C) is lower (resp. larger) than the threshold θ̂(β),
self-1’s optimal decision is to carry on (resp. to stop) the project.
We easily verify that θ̂(β) is increasing with β:
θ̂′(β) =
D
β2(K −K ′)
is positive. So, for all β ∈]0, 1],
θ̂(β) ≤ θ̂(1).
So according to Proposition 1, the range of values in which the hyperbolic agent (β < 1)
may decide to stop his project at period 1 is higher than the one of the exponential agent
(β = 1), also defined as an innovator with consistent preferences.
Lemma 1 E(θ|l, C) ≤ E(θ) ≤ E(θ|h,C) for all C ≥ 0. And E(θ|h,C) is increasing with
C while E(θ|l, C) is decreasing with C.
Then the second part of Lemma 1 suggests that from a certain value of C, the signal
have an impact on the decision.
Moreover, according to Lemma 1 and condition (1), when self-1 receives signal l, he al-
ways decides to continue the project while when he receives signal h, if θ̂(β) is higher
(lower) than E(θ|h,C) self-1 continues (stops) his project.
Overall, two possible cases may occur: either self-1 always continues the project whatever
the signal, or self-1 behaves according to the information he gets and continues (stops)
the project if he receives signal l (h).
2.2 Information acquisition
At period 0, self-0 chooses his optimal research investment C∗(β) to acquire information
on the risk of accident, knowing that at period 1, self-1 either always continues the project
whatever the signal (case 1) or stops (continues) it if he received the signal h (l) (case
2). However, self-0 has no commitment power, he then cannot control the future self’s
decision.
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We first study case 1, i.e. self-1 always continues the project. Self-0’s expected payoff is
V0(1, 1, C) = −I − C + β[p0(R2 − θ
HK) + (1− p0)(R2 − θ
LK)].
Since V0(1, 1, C) is decreasing with C, among all the possible levels of investment, it is
obvious that the optimal solution is
C∗11(β) = 0.
Since, the signal does not have any influence on self-1’s behaviour (i.e. whatever the
signal self-1 continues the project), it is then not surprising that optimally at period
0, self-0 does not want to invest in research and then does not acquire any information.
Overall, optimally case 1 is equivalent to the situation where the innovator is uninformed.
We now turn to case 2. Self-1 stops (continues) the project according to the signal he
receives. Self-0’s expected payoff is
V0(0, 1, C) = −I − C + β[p0(1− f(C))(R2 − θ
HK) + (1− p0)f(C)(R2 − θ
LK)]
+β[p0f(C)(D − θ
HK ′) + (1− p0)(1− f(C))(D − θ
LK ′)].
Define by C01(β) the investment in research which solves the following problem
max
C≥0
V0(0, 1, C). (2)
We get:
Proposition 2 C01(β) is characterized by
f ′(C01(β)) =
1
β[(1− p0)BL − p0BH ]
. (3)
C01(β) is increasing with β.
However, in this case the investment in research chosen by self-0 leads self-1 to choose
the strategy [x∗l = 1, x
∗
h = 0]. We then define by Ĉ(β) the smallest C ≥ 0 which satisfies
the following condition
E(θ|l, C) ≤ θ̂(β) ≤ E(θ|h,C).
Proposition 3 Ĉ(β) is characterized by
f(Ĉ(β)) =
p0(θ
H − θ̂(β))
p0(θH − θ̂(β)) + (1− p0)(θ̂(β)− θL)
.
Ĉ is decreasing with β.
9
Finally, to define the optimal investment in information C∗01(β) that provides useful in-
formation (i.e. a signal that influence self-1’s decision), self-0 has to solve the following
expected payoff maximization problem{
maxC V0(0, 1, C)
Ĉ(β) ≤ C.
Proposition 4 characterizes self-0 ’s optimal investment in research C∗01(β) under the
assumption that self-1 behaves according to [x∗l = 1, x
∗
h = 0] strategy.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique β ∈]0, 1] such that C01(β) = Ĉ(β) and for all
β ∈ [0, β] then C∗01(β) = Ĉ(β); for all β ∈]β, 1] then C
∗
01(β) = C01(β).
We note that β 6= 0. Indeed, if we suppose that β = 0 then:
• f ′(C01(0)) = +∞ and since f is concave, C01(0) = 0;
• f(Ĉ(0)) = p0
2p0−1
.
If C01(0) = Ĉ(0) = 0 then f(0) =
p0
2p0−1
= 1
2
which is impossible because −1 6= 0.
Although self-0 invests in research and self-1 behaves according to the information he
gets, one should underline that the level of this investment depends on the discount value
β.
We define by C∗(β) the optimal research investment. To find C∗(β), we compare the self-
0’s expected payoff of both strategies and we select the level of research investment that
leads, from self-0’s perspective, to the highest expected payoff. This gives the following
proposition.
Proposition 5 The optimal research investment C∗(β) is such that for all β ∈ [0, β]
then C∗(β) = 0; for all β ∈]β, 1] then C∗(β) = C01(β).
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 5. To obtain the shape of the function C01(β), we first
differentiate equation (3) with respect to β, we obtain:
f ′′(C01(β))C
′
01(β) =
−1
β2[(1− p0)BL − p0BH ]
.
And then since f is concave, when β tends towards infinity C ′01(β) tends towards infinity
and when β tends towards zero C ′01(β) tends towards zero. So, we get the following figure:
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Figure 1: Optimal research investment.
Parameter β gathers the set of innovator’s psychological factors. It is then not surprising
that β influences the innovator’s behaviour. For β ∈ [0, β], it is not optimal for the inno-
vator to invest in research. He refuses to acquire information on the probability damage
and keeps innovating. Actually, for β ∈ [0, β], the innovator has a strong preference for
the present. He prefers earning money now than waiting for future payoff. If he gets
information, he has the choice between stopping his project now and recovering a part of
his investment and continuing his project and waiting for return payoff. So his preference
for the present may lead him to stop prematurely his project. To avoid stopping the
project, the innovator may prefer not obtaining information and always continuing.
On the other hand, for β ∈]β, 1] , the optimal investment in information is increasing with
β. It tends toward the optimal investment reached when the agent has time consistent
preferences and a commitment power (i.e. C∗(1)).
Moreover, we note a discontinuity for the optimal research investment function C∗(β).
Actually, since the information precision is increasing with the research investment, the
research investment must be rather large so that the information precision is valuable for
the agent and he then decides to invest in research.
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According to Proposition 5, the exponential agent (β = 1) always invests in research and
his investment is C∗01(1). On the other hand, the hyperbolic agent (β < 1) only gets
information when β ∈]β, 1].
Hence, Result 1 may arise:
Result 1 The hyperbolic discounting effect limits the information acquisition.
This result fits into the literature on hyperbolic discounting. Akerlof (1991) points out
that a time inconsistent innovator (β < 1) always postpones a costly activity (or invest-
ment). In our model since the innovator has only the choice to invest in research at period
0, postponing this investment is equivalent to not doing it.
Now, we may take a look on Figure 2. For β ∈ [0, β], a low investment in research has no
influence on self-1’s behaviour, the information precision is not large enough. Indeed, for
all C ≥ 0, V0(1, 1, 0) > V0(0, 1, C). The investor has strong preferences for the present and
do not really care about what can happen in the future, there is no value of C that makes
him change his behaviour. On the other hand, for β ∈]β, 1], V0(0, 1, C
∗
01(β)) > V0(1, 1, 0)
and C∗01(β) gives a valuable information to self-1.
Figure 2: Optimal research investment with β ∈ [0, β] and β ∈]β, 1].
We make a last remark. If there is no recovered investment D or if D is given at period 2,
the selves 1 with β = 1 and with β < 1 have the same condition to stop or not their
project. Actually, since a hyperbolic innovator (β < 1) much prefers earning money now
than tomorrow, when D is given at period 1, he has more incentive than the exponential
innovator to obtain D now, and to stop the project, than to wait for future gains.
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3 The effect of self-control
According to Salanie´ and Treich (2006), a self-control effect is induced by the hyperbolic
discounting preferences. The self-control effect may be defined as the agents ability to
commit in the future. Hence, a lack of self-control implies that there is no possibility of
commitment between the future selves of the innovator (i.e. β < 1 between the period
1 and the period 2). On the other hand, self-control leads to a commitment power (i.e.
β = 1 between the period 1 and the period 2). Such effect does not depend on whether
the innovator’s preferences display a ’bias for the present’ or not, it is then not straight-
forward that a lack of self-control leads to less research investment.
Self-control problems characterized situations where investors may have difficulties to
undertake long run strategies. For example, the development of chemicals or medicines
might suffer from a possible lack of commitment power. If the research and development
stage concerning a new drug is only realized at the time when the firm invests in this
new product, the decision to develop it is taken according to the information provided
by the R& D stage. Since there is no others information available in the future, there is
no reason for the firm to modify her decision. In others words, as soon as the decision
is taken according to the ex-ante available information, there is self-control. In contrast,
if there is a stock of information available during all the periods of the new product de-
velopment, it is difficult to implement a strategy in the long run, without modifying this
strategy according to the information. In such a case, since the firm might not be able
to commit in the long run, there might be a lack of self-control.
According to Salanie´ and Treich (2006), to analyze the self-control effect on the innova-
tor’s behaviour, we isolate it in comparing the decision of an innovator with a lack of
self-control (see previous section),4 to the decision of an innovator with self-control.
The innovator with self-control follows the same timing of the intra-personal game. His
intertemporal payoffs are similar to those of an innovator with a lack of self-control. We
only switch β < 1 to β = 1 between periods 1 and 2.
We define x∗∗σ the equilibrium strategy after signal σ has been perceived. Thus, we
immediately obtain:
4We already studied the behaviour of an innovator with a lack of self-control in the previous section
which analyzes the impact of the discounting effect on the investor’s decision to invest in research.
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Lemma 2 For all σ ∈ {h, l}, if E(θ|σ,C) < θ̂(1), then x∗∗σ = 1: the innovator continues
the project; if θ̂(1) < E(θ|σ,C), then x∗∗σ = 0: the innovator stops the project.
Lemma 2 characterizes the conditions on the expected probability of the damage accord-
ing to the signal, E(θ|σ,C), under which self-1 with self-control stops or carries on his
project.
According to Lemma 1 and condition (1), we obtain two cases again. Self-1 always con-
tinues the project whatever the received signal; or self-1 continues (stops) the project if
he receives the signal l (h).
Self-0 gets the same intertemporal payoff than the one of an innovator with a lack of self-
control. Only the damage probability threshold that condition self-1’s decision changes:
θ̂(β) is switching in θ̂(1). We define C∗∗(β) the optimal research investment for an inno-
vator with self-control. We then obtain:
Lemma 3 There exists β ∈ [0, 1] such that C01(β) = Ĉ(1). Then C
∗∗(β) is such that for
all β ∈ [0, β] then C∗∗(β) = 0; for all β ∈]β, 1] then C∗∗(β) = C01(β).
We note that β may be equal to zero. Indeed, if β = 0 then f ′(C01(0)) = +∞.
Since f is concave that implies C01(β) = 0. If C01(0) = Ĉ(1) = 0, we obtain that
f(0) = p0(θ
H−θ̂(1))
p0(θH−θ̂(1))+(1−p0)(θ̂(1)−θL)
= 1
2
. Thus, E(θ) = θ̂(1) which is impossible by assump-
tion.
It is then not surprising that β influences the innovator’s behaviour again. For low value
of β, the innovator ignores the information and continues the project. Nevertheless, for
high values of β, linking innovation and information acquisition seems possible.
We turn now to the self-control effect and compare the behaviour of the innovator with
a lack of self-control to the behaviour of the innovator with self-control.
First, according to Proposition 1 and Lemma 3 when the self-0 gets information, the in-
novator with self-control has more opportunity to achieve the project than the innovator
with a lack of self-control.
Moreover, according to Proposition 5 and Lemma 3, the innovator with a lack of self-
control (respectively with self-control) does not invest in research when β ≤ β (respec-
tively. β ≤ β) and starts investing after this threshold. β and β are respectively charac-
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terized by C01(β) = Ĉ(β) and C01(β) = Ĉ(1). We then obtain:
Lemma 4 β < β.
So, according to Proposition 5 and Lemmas 3 and 4, we obtain that:
• If β ∈ [0, β], then C∗(β) = C∗∗(β) = 0;
• if β ∈]β, β], then C∗(β) = 0 and C∗∗(β) = C∗01(β);
• if β ∈]β, 1], then C∗(β) = C∗∗(β) = C∗01(β).
Figure 3 illustrates this result.
Figure 3: The effect of self-control on the investment in research.
When β ∈ [0, β], both innovators (i.e. with self control and with a lack of self-control)
prefer ignoring the information on the probability of damage because they strongly dis-
count the cost of damage. But, when β ∈]β, β], the innovator with self-control starts
investing in research to acquire information, while the innovator with a lack of self-
control prefers staying ignorant. Finally, when β ∈]β, 1] both types of innovators acquire
information and choose the same research investment level. As a result, we finally obtain:
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Result 2 The self-control effect limits the information acquisition.
Moreover, we again point out that if there is no recovered investment D, or if D is given
at period 2, there is no self-control effect.5
4 Solutions to incentive the information acquisition
Firms are constrained by a legal framework, in which liability rules specify how to allocate
damages from an accident. Regarding innovation as well as other risky activities, when
they have to decide whether to start and continue their activities, they should receive
the correct incentives not to neglect risk and information acquisition. Under scientific
uncertainty, the ’precautionary principle’ should lead to such behaviours, but it remains
difficult to apply. In this regard, this section proposes to analyze how, at the innovator
level, through the existing regulatory framework of risk prevention, in particular strict
liability rule and negligence rule, we may find a way to implement such a principle by
developing incentives to both enhance innovation and information acquisition.
4.1 The strict liability rule
Under a strict liability rule, the innovator is fully liable and thus he must pay for the
damages caused by his activities. Nevertheless, his responsibility is engaged only if the
victims can demonstrate a causality link between the damage and the activity or the
product sold. Such a rule implies that the innovator needs to consider the effect on acci-
dent losses of both his level of care, and his level of activity. Thus, he exercises optimal
prevention efforts to reduce the risks and undertakes the optimal level of care (i.e. paying
the optimal cost of care).
In our model, we investigate intertemporal investment behaviour in a potentially risky
project. We suppose that if an accident happens, the innovator suffers the financial cost.
Thus, we implicitly suppose that the innovator is constrained by a strict liability rule.
Moreover, we define the level of care as the level of investment in research (i.e. information
acquisition). By investing in research, the innovator gets information on the dangerous-
ness of his activity and then he can decide to stop it or not. It is a way to underline
the impact of the liability rule on the innovator behaviour, although both the ex-ante
investment I and the cost of damages K which do not depend on C (like in the case in
the usual models of liability). Indeed, if the innovator exercises the level of care C and
receives a signal of high danger (i.e. σ = h), he stops his activity and then limits the cost
of damages (i.e. K ′ < K). Otherwise, if he does not exercise C, he never stops his project
5θ̂(β) = θ̂(1) and β = β.
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and therefore he exposes the environment or the people health to a more severe risk, for
which he is responsible. In such a case, he suffers a higher financial cost in case of accident.
A liability rule is efficient when it gives the right incentives to prevent risks and to re-
duce damages. In our model, the efficiency of the strict liability rule is linked to the
innovator’s ability to obtain information that may reduce at the end the financial cost of
damages. In other words, the rule is efficient when the innovator invests in research and
gets useful information. Moreover, when the agent’s selves can perfectly internalize the
externality they exert on future selves (i.e. β = 1), strict liability rule leads the innovator
to undertake the optimal ’cost of care’ (Shavell 1980, 1992, Miceli, 1997). Thus, we say
that the rule is fully efficient when the innovator is willing to pay this optimal cost of
care C∗(1). Otherwise, if the investment in research is lower, the rule is less efficient,
and if the investment is null, the rule is not efficient. We define the efficiency of a strict
liability rule like the ability of an innovator to invest in research. We obtain
Result 3 The impact of time inconsistency is such that for β ∈ [0, β], the strict liability
rule is inefficient; for β ∈]β, 1[, the strict liability rule efficiency is increasing with β; for
β = 1, the strict liability rule is fully efficient.
Time inconsistency leads to a lower and decreasing investment in research. Moreover, for
small values of β, innovators might prefer being liable and develop their activities, than
getting information on the risk of damage of their project and being tempted to stop it
prematurely. Thus, hyperbolic discounting preferences limits the efficiency of the strict
liability rule to incite the innovator to acquire information.
4.2 The negligence rule
Under a negligence rule, it is said that ”the injurer [innovator] is liable for the victim’s
only if he failed to take a minimum level of care” (Miceli, 1997), also defined as a ’due
standard of care’ by Shavell (1980, 1992). In such a case, he has to pay for the damages.
On the other hand, if he exercises at least the level of care, he is not liable and the victims
or the State pay the financial cost.
In our model, we define by CNR(β) the level of investment in research to exercise, not
to be liable if an accident occurs. Since CNR(β) is an investment in information on the
probability of damage to reduce the uncertainty linked to the project, it does not repre-
sent the ability of the innovator to exercise physical prevention efforts. Thus, we define
CNR(β) like a due standard of research.6
6We define CNR(β) like a due standard of research and not a due standard of care, because it is an
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According to the literature, we should define CNR(β) as the optimal cost of investment
in research, from which the innovator is not liable for the damage. However, due to time
inconsistency and uncertainty, for low β (i.e. β ∈ [0, β]), the optimal level of investment
in research is null. Thus, if CNR(β) = C∗(β) = 0 for β ∈ [0, β], the innovator will never
be liable when an accident occurs. Applying a negligence rule would have no impact on
the innovator’s behaviour, except if we define, for low level of β, CNR(β) as the imposed
level of investment in research, in order to force the innovator to acquire information
(i.e. to exercise a minimum level of care), whatever his intertemporal preferences, and to
behave according to this information.
Nevertheless, to make the investor change his behaviour, it should also be on his interest
to undertake such imposed investment. Thus, for β ∈]0, β], his intertemporal expected
payoff needs to be higher when he is not liable than when he is. In such a case, he is
then never tempted to invest less than CNR(β) and then to be at fault. Remember that
according to Proposition 1, at period 1, the investor has to choose between two strategies:
to carry on his project whatever the signal he receives, or to continue (to stop) it only if
he gets signal l (h). We define pσ as the probability to receive the signal σ:
pl(C) = p0(1− f(C)) + (1− p0)f(C) and ph(C) = p0f(C) + (1− p0)(1− f(C)).
Thus, at period 0, if the agent undertakes the due standard of research, his expected
intertemporal payoffs according to the strategies chosen are
V NR0 (1, 1, C) = V0(1, 1, C) |K=K′=0= −I − C + βR2,
V NR0 (0, 1, C) = V0(0, 1, C) |K=K′=0= −I − C + βplR2 + βphD
Since we define CNR(β) as the minimum investment in research that makes him change
his behaviour: CNR(β) is thus the minimum cost of research that provides him infor-
mation that influence, when he is not liable, his decision to stop or continue the project
at period 1. In others words, CNR(β) is such that the innovator is at least indifferent
between getting V NR0 (1, 1, C) or V
NR
0 (0, 1, C). Moreover, we know that for low value of
β, the agent is more concerned by present satisfaction, he optimally prefers not investing
in information and getting V NL0 . To avoid such effect, C
NR(β) has also to be the cost
that leads the innovator to be indifferent between ”being informed but not liable”, and
”staying uniformed but being liable for damages”. In others words, if he refuses to pay
this due standard of research, he pays the financial cost of damages, if an accident occurs,
and he gets self-0’s expected payoff, when self-0 decides not to obtain information, i.e.
V NL0 . Otherwise, if he invests C
NR(β), he does not have to pay for damages, but the
information acquisition on the risk of damage and not in physical prevention measures. Nevertheless, in
a general approach, they are equivalent notions.
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information is useful to limit the cost of these damages (i.e. even if the innovator does
not pay for damages, if he receives a signal of high danger (σ = h), he stops his activity).
Therefore, for low level of β, the due standard of research is such that
V NR0 (1, 1, C) = V
NR
0 (0, 1, C) and V
NR
0 (0, 1, C) = V
NL
0 (β).
which is equivalent to CNR(β) = βE(θ)K (4)
Thus, if the investors invests less than CNR(β), he is liable for damages and gets a lower
payoff, than the one he could obtain if he invests at least CNR(β). Moreover, he also
obtains useful information and then limits people and environment’s exposition to the
dangerousness of his activity.
On figure 4 below, we represent, for a given β ∈ [0, β], CNR(β), as well as the investor
expected payoff whereas he respects or not the due standard of research (black line).
For low value of β, we also could have imposed CNR(β)) = C∗01(β) |K=K′=0 as the due
standard of research. Indeed, as we force the investor to change his behaviour and to
choose the strategy [x∗l = 1, x
∗
h = 0], he should then prefer investing C01(β) |K=K′=0 in
information, which allows him to maximize his expected payoff V NR0 (0, 1, C), and always
provides him a higher payoff than the one he gets without any information if he is liable
for damages (V NL0 (β)). Thus for β ∈ [0, β], the due standard of research defined by (4)
is the smallest value of the due standard of research to impose.
Otherwise, for β ∈]β, 1], under a strict liability rule, the innovator optimally invests
C01(β) to obtain information . Thus, the due standard of research under negligence
should be equal to the optimal level research C∗01(β), when the investor is not liable (i.e.
K = K ′ = 0).
Overall, we obtain:
Proposition 6 The due standard of research CNR(β) is such that for β ∈ [0, β[,
CNR(β) ∈ [CNR(β), C∗01(β) |K=K′=0], with C
NR(β) = βE(θ)K ; for β ∈ [β, 1],
CNR(β) = C∗01(β) |K=K′=0.
We remark that for all β, CNR(β) is strictly positive. In term of information acquisi-
tion, the negligence rule is thus more efficient than the strict liability rule; it leads to an
investment in research under time inconsistency closer to the one exercised under time
consistency.
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Figure 4: Due standard of research.
Furthermore, a negligence rule may limit innovation. An informed innovator has more
opportunities to stop his project. In particular, for low β, while a negligence rule lays
down a minimum investment in research, a strict liability rule leads the innovator to be
uniformed and always to continue the project. We then obtain the following result
Result 4 Comparing the impact of strict liability rule and negligence rule on innovation
and information acquisition, we obtain for β ∈ [0, β[, a negligence rule favours informa-
tion acquisition but limits innovation, while a strict liability rule favours innovation but
limits information acquisition; For β ∈ [β, 1], both rules are equivalent and they allow to
a combination between innovation and information acquisition.
However, from a social perspective, the negligence rule is more efficient. It proposes
a minimum research investment that a hyperbolic investor is willing to undertake, and
provides information that may influence the innovator’s decision to continue or not his
project. Thus ,it allows to limit damages in case of an accident happens. Hence, we
obtain the following result:
Result 5 Under hyperbolic discounting preferences and uncertainty, the negligence rule
is socially more efficient than the strict liability rule.
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Nevertheless, under hyperbolic discounting preferences and uncertainty, both liability
rules are difficult to apply and can have pervert effect on innovation and information
acquisition: combining both of them remain difficult.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the information acquisition of an agent with hyperbolic dis-
counting preferences who wants to undertake a potential dangerous activities. Possible
examples of application of this model include innovators in new technologies (e.g. nan-
otechnologies, mobile phones), pharmaceutical firms (e.g. development and production
of new drugs) or chemical firms (e.g. production of new fertilizers). Since for the GMOs
plants farm’s example, in all those cases innovators produce while they may have an
incomplete knowledge on the dangerousness of their activities in the long run. We find
that for large enough values of the discount rate, the innovator acquires information on
the damages risks. His investment in research is increasing with the value of β: it tends
towards the level of investment reached when the agent has time consistent preferences
and is allowed to commit in the long run. On the other hand, for small values of the
discount rate the innovator may ignore the information: he refuses to invest in research
to obtain information on the dangerousness of his activity in order to achieve his project.
Moreover, if the hyperbolic discounting preferences limit the innovator’s ability to ac-
quire information, the lack of self-control (i.e. no commitment between the different
future selves of the innovators) strengthens this limitation.
We also observe that if the investor does not have the possibility to recover a part of his
initial investment when he gives up his project (i.e. no salvage value (D)), or if he can
only obtain this salvage value at the project’s date of maturity (i.e. at the period 2),
both the discounting and the self-control effects would not have any impact on his de-
cisions to completely or partially achieve his project. Actually, the innovator with time
inconsistency preferences is more concerned by current rewards than by future ones and
in particular when there is a possible delayed cost. Since D is given at period 1, the
hyperbolic innovator is more likely than the exponential one to earn D now and to stop
his project, than to wait for future gains and maybe to suffer the delayed cost of damages.
Moreover, we underline that hyperbolic discounting preferences also limit the efficiency of
the legal framework, and in particular of the strict liability rule. If there are situations in
which an innovator prefers being uninformed in order to develop his activity, one should
define others rules and incentives to ensure that investments in innovation’s projects are
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not done to the detriment of information acquisition and conversely. In this regard, even
if it does not always lead to an optimal choice, we consider the application of a complete
negligence rule as a possible alternative solution.
However, lessons have to be learned from practical examples. Regarding GMO crops and
sales, the current legislation does not seem to be completely efficient to prevent potential
risks, to ensure a safe use of such organisms and to identify who should take responsibil-
ity for them. For example, it is particularly the case when non-modified organisms are
contaminated by modified organisms through pollens scattering. This confirms our re-
sults: if scientific uncertainty limits the effect of a strict liability on producers’ decisions,
time inconsistent preferences strengthen such limitation. Nevertheless, experiences also
underline the persuasive role that strict liability can play on producers behaviour, even if
its application remains difficult. Weill (2005) notes that when the ’burden of the proof’
is in on the potential injurer, and not on the victims, as it is the case under a negligence
rule, producers are more likely to stop potentially dangerous products from the market.
The recent European legislation on chemicals (REACH directive)7 tackles the challenging
issue related to the application of the precautionary principle to both enhance innovation
as well as people and environment protection. It is based on a strict liability rule, under
which the ’burden of the proof’ is on the industry, but it also requires manufacturers and
importers to take the responsibility ”to gather information on the properties and risks of
all substances produced or imported”.8 This legislation proposes an interesting way to
implement the precautionary principle to deal with chemicals, by combining the positive
effects of a strict liability rule, to a research obligation for firms that should avoid the
negative ones. This approach should provide relevant elements in the current debate on
the regulation of others kind of scientific and/or technological innovation.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
At period 1, the innovator receives the signal σ ∈ {h, l}. For all C ≥ 0, he chooses to
continue i.e. xσ = 1 if
V1(1, σ, C) ≥ V1(0, σ, C) i.e. E(θ|σ,C) ≤ θ̂(β) ≡
βR2 −D
β(K −K ′)
.
7REACH stands for Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals
8for more details on REACH, see European Commission [28].
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¥Proof of Lemma 1
Since θH > θL and for all C ≥ 0, f(C) ≥ 1
2
we obtain that
E(θ|l, C)− E(θ) =
(1− p0)p0(θ
H − θL)(1− 2f(C))
(1− p0)f(C) + p0(1− f(C))
≤ 0
and
E(θ)− E(θ|h,C) =
(1− p0)p0(θ
L − θH)(2f(C)− 1)
p0f(C) + (1− p0)(1− f(C))
≤ 0.
Thus, E(θ|l, C) ≤ E(θ) ≤ E(θ|h,C).
We differentiate E(θ|h,C) with respect to C, we obtain
(1− p0)p0f
′(C)(θH − θL)
[(1− p0)(1− f(C)) + p0f(C)]2
which is positive. Thus, E(θ|h,C) is increasing with C.
We differentiate E(θ|l, C) with respect to C, we obtain
(1− p0)p0f
′(C)((θL − θH)
[p0(1− f(C)) + (1− p0)f(C)]2
which is negative. Thus, E(θ|l, C) is decreasing with C.
¥
Proof of Proposition 2
Concavity of V0(0, 1, C): We differentiate V0(0, 1, C) with respect to C, we obtain
−1 + β[(1− p0)B
L − p0B
H ]f ′(C). (5)
We differentiate equation (5) with respect to C, we obtain
β[(1− p0)B
L − p0B
H ]f ′′(C).
Since f is concave, BL is positive and BH is negative then V0(0, 1, C) is concave.
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The solution C01(β) to problem (2) is characterized by
−1 + β[(1− p0)B
L − p0B
H ]f ′(C01(β)) = 0 ⇔ f
′(C01(β)) =
1
β[(1− p0)BL − p0BH ]
.
Since BL is positive and BH is negative, we verify that f ′(C01(β)) > 0.
We easily check that f ′(C01(.)) is decreasing with β. Since f is concave then C01 is in-
creasing with β.
¥
Proof of Proposition 3
According to Lemma 1 and condition (1), Ĉ(β) the smallest C ≥ 0 which satisfies
E(θ|l, C) ≤ θ̂(β) ≤ E(θ|h,C)
is such that either
E(θ|l, Ĉ(β)) = θ̂(β) < E(θ|h, Ĉ(β)) or E(θ|l, Ĉ(β)) < θ̂(β) = E(θ|h, Ĉ(β))
Define Ĉ1(β) which verifies that E(θ|l, Ĉ(β)) = θ̂(β) we obtain
f(Ĉ1(β)) =
p0(θ
H − θ̂(β))
p0(θH − θ̂(β)) + (1− p0)(θ̂(β)− θL)
.
Define Ĉ2(β) which verifies that E(θ|h, Ĉ(β)) = θ̂(β) we obtain
f(Ĉ2(β)) =
(1− p0)(θ̂(β)− θ
L)
p0(θH − θ̂(β)) + (1− p0)(θ̂(β)− θL)
.
Since f is increasing to compare Ĉ1(β) and Ĉ2(β) we compare f(Ĉ1(β)) and f(Ĉ2(β)).
We obtain that if E(θ) < θ̂(β) then Ĉ(β) = Ĉ1(β); and if E(θ) > θ̂(β) then Ĉ(β) = Ĉ2(β).
According to condition (1), we obtain that Ĉ(β) = Ĉ1(β). Moreover, we easily show that
f(Ĉ(β)) ≥
1
2
.
We differentiate f(Ĉ(β)) with respect to β we obtain
−p0(1− p0)θ̂′(β)(θ
H − θL)
[p0(θH − θ̂(β)) + (1− p0)(θ̂(β)− θL)]2
that is negative. According to Lemma 1 and condition (1), since f is increasing then
Ĉ(β) is decreasing with β.
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¥Proof of Proposition 4
Since Ĉ(β) is decreasing with β and C01 is increasing with β there exists a β ∈]0, 1] such
that C01(β) = Ĉ(β).
Since Ĉ(β) is the smallest C ≥ 0 which satisfies the following condition
E(θ|l, C) ≤ θ̂(β) ≤ E(θ|h,C),
we get that if β ∈ [0, β] then C∗01(β) = Ĉ(β); and if β ∈]β, 1] then C
∗
01(β) = C01(β).
¥
Proof of Proposition 5
The optimal research investment C∗(β) is such that
• if V0(0, 1, C
∗
01(β)) > V0(1, 1, 0) then C
∗(β) = C∗01(β);
• otherwise C∗(β) = 0.
We compare V0(0, 1, C
∗
01(β)) and V0(1, 1, 0). According to Proposition 4, we have for all
β ∈ [0, β] then C∗01(β) = Ĉ(β); for all β ∈]β, 1] then C
∗
01(β) = C01(β).
We first compare V0(0, 1, Ĉ(β)) and V0(1, 1, 0). We obtain
V0(0, 1, Ĉ(β))− V0(1, 1, 0) = −Ĉ(β) + β[−p0f(Ĉ(β))B
H − (1− p0)(1− f(Ĉ(β)))B
L].
We replace f(Ĉ(β)). We obtain
−Ĉ(β) + β
[
p20(θ
H − θ̂(β))BH − (1− p0)
2(θ̂(β)− θL)BL
p0(θH − θ̂(β)) + (1− p0)(θ̂(β)− θL)
]
which is negative because of condition (1). Thus for all β ∈ [0, β] we obtain that
V0(0, 1, Ĉ(β))) < V0(1, 1, 0).
Then C∗(β) = 0.
Now we compare V0(0, 1, C01(β)) and V0(1, 1, 0). It is easily verified that V0(1, 1, 0) and
V0(0, 1, C) are both increasing with β. We differentiate V0(1, 1, 0) with respect to β we
obtain
p0(R2 − θ
HK) + (1− p0)(R2 − θ
LK)
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that is positive by assumption.
We differentiate V0(0, 1, C) with respect to β we obtain
p0(1− f(C))(R2 − θ
HK) + (1− p0)f(C)(R2 − θ
LK)
+p0f(C)(D − θ
HK ′) + (1− p0)(1− f(C))(D − θ
LK ′)
which is positive by assumption.
We suppose that V0(0, 1, C01(β)) = V0(1, 1, 0) this implies that
f(C01(β)) =
β(1− p0)B
L + C01(β)
β[(1− p0)BL − p0BH ]
. (6)
We differentiate V0(0, 1, C01(β)) and V0(1, 1, 0) with respect to β and we replace f(C01)
by the right hand side of equation (6). Since for all β ∈ [0, 1] C01(β) ≥ 0, we obtain that
∂V0(0, 1, C01(β)
∂β
) ≥
∂V0(1, 1, 0)
∂β
.
Thus, there exists β˜ ∈ [0, 1] such that V0(0, 1, C01(β˜)) = V0(1, 1, 0) and
• for all β ∈ [0, β˜] then V0(0, 1, C01(β)) ≤ V0(1, 1, 0);
• for all β ∈]β˜, 1] then V0(0, 1, C01(β)) > V0(1, 1, 0).
We notice that for β = 0, we obtain C01(0) = 0 and then V0(0, 1, C01(0)) = V0(1, 1, 0) = −I.
Thus, β˜ = 0 and for all for all β ∈]0, 1] then V0(0, 1, C01(β)) > V0(1, 1, 0). Since β 6= 0
then for all for all β ∈]β, 1] C∗(β) = C01(β).
Overall we obtain for all β ∈ [0, β] then C∗(β) = 0; for all β ∈]β, 1] then C∗(β) = C01(β).
¥
Proof of Lemma 2
Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, thus omitted.
¥
Proof of Lemma 3
Similar to the proof of Proposition 5, thus omitted.
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¥Proof of Lemma 4
By definition
C01(β) = Ĉ(β) and C01(β) = Ĉ(1).
Since Ĉ is decreasing with β then
Ĉ(1) < Ĉ(β¯) and so C01(β) < C01(β).
Since C01 is increasing with β we obtain
β < β.
¥
Proof of Proposition 6
For β ∈ [0, β], CNR(β) is characterized by
V NR0 (1, 1, C) = V
NR
0 (0, 1, C
NR) i.e. βR2(1− pl(C
NR(β)))− βph(C
NR(β))D = 0
and
V NR0 (0, 1, C
NR(β)) = V NL0 i.e. C
NR(β) + βph(C
NR(β))(R2 −D) = βE(θ)K.
Thus, we get CNR(β) = βE(θ)K.
However, if the agent invests CNR(β), his intertemporal pay-off is V NR0 (0, 1, C), and he
solves the following maximisation problem:{
maxC V
NR
0 (0, 1, C)
E(θ|l, C) < θ̂(β) < E(θ|h,C).
that is equivalent to {
maxC V0(0, 1, C)|K=0,K′=0
E(θ|l, C) < θ̂(β) < E(θ|h,C).
So we obtain: CNR(β) = C∗01(β) |K=K′=0.
Thus, for all β ∈ [0, β], CNR(β) ∈ [CNR(β), C∗01(β) |K=K′=0], with C
NR(β) = βE(θ)K.
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Since for β ∈]β, 1] it is optimal to invest in research. The innovator solves the following
problem {
maxC V
NR
0 (0, 1, C)
E(θ|l, C) < θ̂(β) < E(θ|h,C).
Thus, we obtain that CNR(β) = C∗01(β) |K=K′=0.
Overall we obtain that ∀β ∈ [0, β[, CNR(β) ∈ [CNR(β), C∗01(β) |K=K′=0]; et ∀β ∈ [β, 1],
CNR(β) = C∗01(β) |K=K′=0.
¥
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